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Abstract 
The main objective of this study is to examine the role of social capital on collective action in natural resource 
management. Based on investigating a series of updated theoretical and empirical evidences on the role of social 
capital in collective action, mainly in natural resource management areas, the following common key findings are 
worth drawn: 
Examined literatures generally indicated that natural resources need protection from destructive actions of people 
to achieve sustainable development. Thus far, communities have shown in the past and increasingly today that 
they can collaborate for long-term resource management. Social capital variables like heterogeneity index, 
bridging and linking social capital, civic engagement, cooperative norms, limited numbers of participants and 
formalized groups are found to be very significant and positively affecting collective action for community’s 
achieving sustainable natural resource development. Particularly, indicated that the aforementioned variables are 
playing a fundamental role in reducing transaction cost of exchange like reducing cost of enforcing rules and 
information asymmetry; and improve local authority performance by pooling them in the networks. 
This study is also aimed to review varies literatures to investigate whether there is positive relation between social 
capital and collective environmental action.Most study used model estimation of social capital variables in 
collective action revealed that the higher the social capital level, the more likely individual is willing to contribute 
in collective action to protect the natural resource. Results also found that individuals with higher degree of social 
capital are more likely to participate in collective actions because they can access more information, develop 
linkages and engage in decision making processes. Similarly, based on the findings, most literature also showed 
that in formalized groups, social capital is high, and people have the confidence to invest in collective activities in 
achieving their common natural resource goals. 
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1. Introduction 
Natural resource management is not only influenced by physical and economic capital but also social capital. 
According to Guillen et al (2015), Social capital is an indispensable aspect of community natural resource 
management implementation because communities surrounding the resource have limited physical and economic 
capital. Therefore, the communities need to preserve social capital to improve their economic wellbeing both 
directly and indirectly (Iswandono 2015). As for Coleman (1988) social capital refers to the individual and 
collective resources that can be mobilized through social relations and is applicable to the ground of community 
development endeavors. 
Putnam (1993) defines social capital as trust, norms, and networks, which can improve the efficiency of 
society by facilitating coordinated actions. (Roslinda et al (2017argued that strong social capital should be given 
due consideration by the government to support community development programs. Social capital can facilitate 
the collective action of society and provide a strong influence on the process of improving social welfare. The 
value of trust in social capital is leading as the basis for communities to increase respect and mutual benefit. Trust 
is an necessary component of social capital formation in any country, while other aspects of cooperation and 
networking will not be well established if they are not based on mutual trust between community members 
(Cahyono 2014; Innah et al. 2013). Fisher (2013) pointed out that trust become an important medium that allows 
passive information to be transformed into valuable knowledge. The idea is supported by Guillen et al. (2015) who 
argued the importance of personal relationships and the catalyst role of social capital ties in natural resource 
management.  
Many successful collective actions have been achieved by communities in natural resource management, but 
those still look some challenges when dealing with low social capital in society. Nooteboom (2006) revealed that 
the measurements of social capital are subjective, aspects of behavior, the limits of trust, and the distinction 
between reliability. Therefore, this term paper is aimed to study the role of social capital on collective action 
predominantly in natural resource management, particularly examining common attributes of social capital that 
can create varying capacities for different type’s collective actions through the interplay of characteristics of trust, 
norms and networks in community resource management endeavours  endeavors 
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1.1. Statement of the Problem  
Among the different capital assets owned by communities, social capital deserves particular policy attention 
because of its diverse nature and its potential influence on the development of formal and informal cooperation 
(Ostrom 1994) for achieving social and sustainable development.  
More or less every country in the world has challenged by social capital problem to realize sustainable 
development. As government sector cannot do the task alone, the success of sustainable development must 
comprise contribution from all three stakeholders i.e. government, private sector and community. The potential of 
community to involve in solving social problems in collective action has been greater eventually and to be 
optimizing this potential, it is vital to understand well on the behavior of individual as an optimizing agent in the 
context of community collective action. Understanding and examining what common attributes of social capital, 
contribute in encouraging community to make collective action in all development endeavors are very useful for 
policy maker to consider in what way government can intervene and how can government make policy that can 
synergize between government and community action. As Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) mentioned that 
understanding the behavior of community and individual in communities making decisions to solve their common 
problem and how self-‐governed solutions can emerge are both crucial to enhance policy analysis. In regard to 
the role of community, various studies have explored what drives individual participate in collective action and 
what makes it effective in solving community problem they are facing, however social capital factors s that are 
affecting the effectiveness of collective action in natural resource management endeavors are rare examined from 
different literatures; so this study is aimed at to address the aforementioned problem.  
 
1.1. Objective of the study 
1.2. The overall objective of this study is to examine the role of social capital on collective action in natural 
resource management 
     Specific objectives   
• To examine the major top attributes of social capital that are affecting collective action in community 
natural resource management 
• To examine the level of relations between social capital and collective action. 
 
2. Literature Review 
2.1. Concept and definition of Social Capital  
The conceptualization of social capital has been chiefly crystallized into three broadly defined families of research. 
even though these share the concern with the effects of social relationships originally highlighted by Bourdieu, 
developed by Coleman and lengthily used by Putnam (Bourdieu 1985; Coleman 1988; Coleman 1990; Putnam, 
Leonardi, and Nanetti 1993), each of these families presents very different claims as to what social capital is and 
does, focusing in turn on socially accessed goods, social trust, and finally on networks and the norms bounded by 
them to realize their common goal collectively.  . 
The first approach sees social capital as socially accessed resources, or goods obtained through networks, and 
are traceable to Pierre Bourdieu’s definition of the concept. Bourdieu saw social capital as supplementary to 
physical and cultural capital: individuals use their personal networks to mobilize other types of goods (Bourdieu 
1980; Bourdieu 1985). A comparable approach has been taken by sociologists working on social capital, especially 
those with a background in network theory, such as Nan Lin and Ronald Burt (Lin 1999; Burt 2000). This 
conceptualization is fundamentally different from the others to the level that it sees the resource in social capital 
as being the goods accessed through networks; while the others observe the social capital as resource in its own 
right. As Szreter and Woolcock wrote:‘…the “mainstream” social capital literature, represented pragmatically 
by the work of Putnam, regards social capital as the “wires” while network theorists regard it as the “electricity”’ 
(Szreter and Woolcock 2004). 
The additional two strands of social capital research take an interest in its capacity to facilitate cooperation 
and collective action, slightly than in its capacity to mobilize other resources. The social trust approach privileges 
the position of trust characters across entire societies taking a macro-level approach; the norms and networks 
approach takes a mainly meso perspective on the alike issue, looking for the sources of collective action in 
delimited groups and middle-order organizations both formal and informal. 
Definitions of social capital that benefit the role of social trust as a source of cooperation and commonly 
beneficial collective action take a diversity of forms. Some see social capital as cultural features of societies in 
general that facilitate these actions, articulated through social trust and adherence to civic norms (Knack and Keefer 
1997; Fukuyama 2001); others follow Robert Putnam’s premature definitions of the concept and see social capital 
as the combination of networks with norms and values, usually expressed as individual answers to social trust and 
civic norms survey questions. now the relationship between trust and  networks  is hypothesized either one of two 
ways: in some cases participation in social networks are said to be the source of social trust and civic norms (Stolle 
2003), even as other authors see social participation as a consequence of a society’s level of trust and devotion to 
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civic norms (Uslaner 2000). 
The social trust approach has attracted widespread disapproval, whichever way the relationships between the 
elements of social capital are posited. Many authors have failed to find any clear relationship between individual 
cooperative acts, such as membership of voluntary associations, and social trust. Glaeser and his colleagues found 
little verification of trust embedded in networks being ‘scaled-up’ to social trust; in a comparative survey of 
association members, Stolle also found little substantiation of membership being strongly related to social trust, 
as contrasting to the usual variables of income, age, education and personal experience (Glaeser et al.1999; Stolle 
2001; Stolle 2003). Studies using longitudinal data have also found no confirmation of social trust having a power 
on the joining of voluntary associations and only small effects of joining on trust (Claibourn and Martin 2000). 
The last ‘school’ of social capital research focuses on the convergence of norms and networks within 
particular groups, and how these affect their capacity for collective action or cooperation. Such an interpretation 
is an important part of both James Coleman’s and Robert Putnam’s definitions of the thought, even though neither 
approach can be reduced to such a sparse concept. For Putnam, social norms and networks are ‘…an institutional 
mechanism with the power to ensure compliance with the collectively desirable behaviour’ (Putnam 2000).  
On top of were some of the questions left unanswered by the social trust perspective for which a norms and 
networks approach can give plausible answers. However, this study does not intend to discuss the relationship 
between social trust and social capital, rather to focus on examining common factors of social capital attributes 
affecting collective action in community development. Whilst leaving an open  decision  on the social trust ‘school’ 
of social capital, this very concise introduction to the concept does not intend to imply that a norms and networks 
approach to social capital is superior to the accessed resources school mentioned first in this review. Two points 
are necessary here: firstly, the role of norms and networks in providing access to resources, and in being resources 
themselves that can be triggered for collective action are not mutually exclusive dimensions, rather two sides of 
the same coin. Secondly, it must be recognized that access to resources is both a component and often an objective 
of collective action (a perspective that has, to my knowledge, been so far neglected by the network analysts 
discussed above, other than by treating groups as single individual units). 
 
2.2. The relation between Collective action and social capital  
Most studies have tried to relate collective action problem with social capital concept. Some keywords for this 
relation is reciprocity, trust, altruism, conditional cooperation, networks, institutions, social norms and rules. 
According to, Ahn and Ostrom (2002) have defined such relation by the second generation of collective action. 
Second generation of collective action is the development of previous theory on collective action which outlined 
by the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where in the first generation theories of collective action is an image of atomized, 
selfish, and fully rational individuals. The change has been made on the assumption on individual that it was 
proven in reality and empirical study, typically in field and laboratory experiment, there is a significant portion of 
individual that act non-selfish behavior (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). Likewise, Weible (2008) also tried to explain how 
cooperation might happen. In Olson (1965) argument, individuals made his/her own benefit-cost expectations in 
order to make choice whether or not to participate in collective action. People are assumed to participate because 
of selective incentives, that is, if the private benefits go beyond the private cost. In this case, usually private cost 
exceeds private benefits, and free-rider problem likely to occur. Weible use Collective Interest Model to elucidate 
factor that affect stakeholders’ participation in collaborative institution of Marine Protected Areas and tries to 
overcome this free-rider problem by setting up additional collective interest variables which represent ally efficacy 
and instrument efficacy 
Similarly, the idea of social capital initiated to overcome the dilemmas of collective action (Lochner, Kawachi, 
& Kennedy, 1999). The dilemmas of collective action firstly introduced by Mancur Olson(1965)in his book The 
Logic of Collective Action, and later the use of economic tools in analyzing individual behavior within group is 
rising eventually. Collective action can be defined as the combining of resources to achieve a common, 
communitywide goal (Tilly, 1973). A more specific definition of collective action is provided by Meinzen‐Dick, 
DiGregorio, and McCarthy (2004), who propose that for an activity to qualify as a collective action, it must meet 
four criteria. The activity must involve a group of people, the people in the group must have a shared interest, the 
group must work to extra that shared interest, and the members of the group must do so voluntarily (i.e., not as 
paid staff of an organization).  
Collective action can exist in many varied forms. Some examples include participation community 
development projects (Ryan, Agnitsch, Zhao & Mullick, 2005), participation in participatory budgeting processes 
(Su, 2016; Weber, Crum, & Salinas, 2015), and engagement with neighborhoods watch groups (Pattavina, Byrne, 
& Garcia, 2006; Smith; van Eijk, Steen, & Verschuere, 2017). Definition of collective action differentiating from 
civic commitment and civic participation, for example, an individual can be an active citizen by voting, attending 
community or local government meetings, or writing an opted article. Although these activities may meet some of 
the criteria for collective action as defined above, they do not address them all; therefore, they may be worthwhile 
forms of civic engagement and participation, but they are not collective actions.  
Research on Humanities and Social Sciences                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2224-5766 (Paper)   ISSN 2225-0484 (Online)  
Vol.11, No.19, 2021 
 
13 
Theories of collective action explain setting on a group of individuals, a common interest among them, and 
potential conflict between the common interest and each individual’s interest (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). Olson (1965) 
dispute that without force, an individual with self-interest motives is always better off by choosing not to cooperate 
with others, and more likely to free-ride to enjoy collective benefit at cost of others. This is possible since collective 
goods have non-excludable property on enjoying it. alike argument expressed by Hardin (1968) that in the context 
of exploitation for collective resource , individual for all time end to have narrow-minded view that he/she would 
exploit the resource at the maximum until the resource exhaust, which is known by ‘the tragedy of the commons’. 
In the context of public goods provision, this can be described by free-riders problem. But, Runge (1984) 
developed assumption that if there is some kind of contract that ties the agents, cooperation will occur. Furthermore, 
Ostrom (1990) explained that if agents have infinite perspective in looking the ongoing cooperation, then they tend 
to cooperate. Representatives will be aware of making mistakes since the other agent will have opportunity to 
punish or make revenge. That is why an arm’s length (Hayami & Godo, 2005) in community context is important 
as Olson (1965) argue that small group is an exclusion for collective action to be possible since in this situation, 
iterative interaction happened and the possibility of monitoring as well as punishing free-riding behavior may 
make participation more likely.  
Fehr & Fischbacher(2002) illustrate how to put social preference in the context of collective action instead of 
analyzing collective action in individual context. It is assumed that individual can be grouped into several types: 
selfish and conditional cooperators. Conditional cooperators are people who are willing to contribute more to a 
public good the more others contribute. Conditional cooperation can be considered as a motivation in its own or 
be a consequence of some fairness preferences like ‘altruism’, ‘warm-glow’, ‘inequity aversion’, or ‘reciprocity’. 
In this literature review study it was shown that a third of the subjects could be classified as free riders, where as 
50 percent as conditional cooperators (Fischbacher et. al., 2001). Gould (1993) has developed a clear mathematical 
model about interdependency on individual decision to contribute in a collective action difficulty.  
In this scenario, individual responds to the contributions of others because of effectiveness concerns and 
norms of fairness. This assumption likely will have dissimilar result from Olson’s formulation (1965) which 
individual as rational egoist will have the optimal solution not to contribute; or become free rider. Some studies 
have tried to relate collective action problem with social capital concept. Some keyword for this relation is 
reciprocity, trust, altruism, conditional cooperation, networks, institutions, social norms and rules. 
Ahn and Ostrom (2002) have defined such relation by the second generation of collective action. Second 
generation of collective action is the development of earlier theory on collective action which framed by the 
Prisoner’s Dilemma game, where in the first-generation theories of collective action is an image of atomized, 
selfish, and fully rational individuals. The change has been made on the assumption on individual that it was 
confirmed in reality and empirical study, mostly in field and laboratory experiment, there is a significant portion 
of individual that act non-selfish behavior (Ostrom & Ahn, 2003). Weible (2008) also tried to explain how 
cooperation might happen. In Olson (1965) argument, individuals made his/her own benefit-cost expectations in 
order to make option whether or not to participate in collective action. People are assumed to participate because 
of selective incentives, that is, if the private benefits exceed the private cost. In this case, usually private cost 
exceeds private benefits, and free-rider problem likely to occur. Weible use Collective Interest. 
 
2.3. The role of social capital on collective action in natural resource management 
Based on empirical literature review of reputable journals and articles, the following summary of discussions are 
worth drawn: 
Carbone (2019) in the study of bonding social capital and collective action revealed that individuals with 
higher bonding social capital will have a higher probability of having engaged in collective action. Whereas, 
individuals who have engaged in collective action have a greater probability of having a more negative 
neighborhood perception as compared with individuals who have not engaged in collective action. 
According to Bisung and Elliott 2014), study indicated that apart from financial challenges, the lack of social 
capital is a barrier to collective action for community based water and sanitation initiatives .Similarly, As Von 
Below et al(2020) ,found that investment in building social capital may have some contextual benefits for 
collective action to address common environmental challenges.The findings also informed that policy 
interventions in investing social capita in water and sanitation delivery in low and middle income countries, 
environmental health promotion and community development are crucial. 
Pretty and Ward (2001) indicated that most natural resource management groups with effective social capital 
are small, ranging from 20 to 30 members for effective collective action. Whereas Wuthnow (1994) suggested that 
the ideal group size for maximum trust building is no> 15–20 people for a community  achieving common goals . 
Similarly, Wagner, Kreuter and Kaise (2007) examined Collective Action and Social Capital of Wildlife 
Management Associations  ,revealed that small (>30 members) rather than large (>100) are crucial for wildlife 
management associations may be more effective for building social capital  as a capacity for collective action . 
Group size is an important aspect of social capital building because as membership increases it becomes more 
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difficult to develop trust and reciprocity relationships among members (Wuthnow 1994).  
Suharti , Darusman (2016) in study of social capital to strengthen collective action in environmental 
protection showed that social variables namely ,trust and civic engagement are highly and significantly affecting 
collective action in community development programs .As well, individual characteristics like gender, education 
and age are found to greatly affecting collective action in community development endeavors .In consistency with 
the study,Qurniat , Febryano and Zulfiani (2017) found that the aforementioned variables are significantly and 
positively affecting collective action in community development programs .On the contrary to this study, it was 
found that household income and size are negatively affecting collective action. 
Rahman and Hickey (2015) examined the role of social capital in community collective action for sustainable 
wetland fisheries in Bangladesh. The study used multiple regression model to estimate the influence eight 
independent human capital variables on collective action. As a result of which limited number memberships and 
heterogeneity index have a considerable positive impact collective action. Importantly,  the study indicated that  
minimum number of members required to establish a community fisheries organization is 20, suggesting that the 
organization tries to limit the number of members to the lowest number possible in order to optimize individual 
payoff.  
In the contrast, meeting attendance, index of participation had a considerably negative influence on collective 
action. The index of participation had a negative influence on collective action because most of the decisions in 
the fisheries organization were taken by the community leaders. The study also revealed that collective action 
requires a significant contribution of social capital that comes in three forms: bonding, linking and bridging. 
Bonding social capital is an individual household asset which creates trust and reciprocity among the community 
members and fuels collective action (Dale and Newman 2008). In confirmation to this study, Dale and Sparkes 
(2007) found that bonding social capital is necessary for the collective action of both community members who 
form a fisheries organization and those that don’t. Consequences also indicated that community leaders bridged 
the gap between community members and external agents through linking and bridging social capital, playing a 
central role in collective decision making. 
Uphoff (1993) examined the role of grassroots organizations and NGOs in rural development: opportunities 
with diminishing states and expanding markets .The study found that formally developed organizations are 
generally more active to attain their organizational objectives and are characterized by a higher degree of rule 
imposition. However, as of Ostrom(1990), some organizations may also develop informally and can contribute 
significantly to regulating natural resource use.  
Numerous studies have also identified that natural resource management requires augmented community 
cooperation ,trust and institutionalization when bonding, bridging and linking social capital prevail simultaneously 
in a community (Dale and Sparkes 2007; Dale and Newman 2008). In these situations, higher levels of bonding 
social capital facilitates trust, reciprocity and unselfish behavior among community members which are necessary 
ingredients for cooperation ,operational rule setting, enforcement, transparency and accountability (Ostrom 2009). 
Bridging and linking social capital work to assist with information generation and dispersal within a community, 
and are essential for collective action to achieve common goals. Inconstancy with the above findings, Kim (2018) 
in the study effects of social capital on collective action in community development, found that bridging and 
linking qualities of social networks produced a strong influence on collective action more than any other variable. 
However, the effect of community-level social trust was small and did not explain the extent to which individual-
level social networks exerted influence on collective action. 
According to Pretty (2003), highlighted that social capital is central to community-based development 
circumstance because it facilitates the establishment of user groups through trust, reciprocal behavior and 
connectedness with external agents (e.g., credit access, information providers, political groups etc.) As a result, 
individuals with higher degree of social capital are more likely to participate in collective actions because they can 
access more information, develop linkages and engage in decision making processes (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001; 
Pretty and Ward 2001) 
Krishna( 2002, 2011) examined that bridging and linking social capital is maintained by community leaders 
who keep communication with outside institutions In these situations, the role of local leaders is crucial for the 
collective action of the community because they hold symbolic power in collective decision making and largely 
determine how informal institutions operate(Ballet et al. 2007). Local leaders generally perform these activities by 
organizing and mobilizing collective actions, and also by voluntarily establishing linkages with external agents 
through their own efforts and personal networks (e.g., governmental officials, political groups and credit sources) 
on behalf of potential user groups (Bodin and Crona 2009).  
Kim (2018) assessed the effects of social capital on collective action for community development. Used 
generalized linear model and concluded that social networks have a critical impact on collective action especially 
for the underprivileged that lack resource mobilization opportunities. Specifically, the bridging and linking 
qualities of social networks produced a strong influence on collective action more than any other variable. However, 
the effect of community-level social trust was small and did not explain the extent to which individual-level social 
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networks exerted influence on collective action. 
Ido ( 2019) examined the effect of social capital on collective action in community forest management in 
Cambodi using ordered logistic regression. The study indicated that social capital variables namely, social 
networks and cooperative norms had positive effects on collective actions .The findings of the study aligns with 
the social capital literature, such as Putnam’s theory, which has argued that horizontal networks promote collective 
action (Putnam et al. 1993). Cooperative norms also had a positive effect on collective action in community forest 
management, indicating that communities members shared a high level of cooperative norms were more likely to 
participate. This is because CF members participate in patrols based on cooperative norms to solve the forest 
degradation problem faced by the community. 
Qurniati , Febryano , Zulfiani (2017.) examined  how trust influence social capital to support collective action 
in agro forestry development .The study found that  trust is an important factor for strengthening social capital.  
The study also argued that trust in forest community is achieved through collective action in small scale agro 
forestry. It was challenging process regards the low on social capital in communities. The study also revealed that 
trust between farmer group members remains high. However, trust as a source of social capital was not supported 
collective action since farmer group institution is weak. Therefore, to support agro forestry development, social 
capital should be increased through the development of good networks (bridging) to reach collective goal i.e. 
community welfare and sustainable forest management. 
Hwang and Stewart (2017) in the study of social capital and collective action in rural truism indicated that 
the qualities of one’s social networks are relevant to the tendency to participate in tourism development. The closer 
one’s relationship to a community leader of tourism development, the more likely they are to be part of community-
based efforts for tourism development. The result also revealed that, compared to individualized personal ties 
among residents, already existing social organizations were critical to enhance collective action of residents. An 
implication for increased participation in tourism development is for community leaders to reach out and learn 
from residents who are isolated or less central within community leadership networks. 
 
3. Methodology  
Data analysis was employed in order to examine the objectives under study. Purposely, theoretical and inferential 
information was reviewing from a number of independent studies of the same subject, in order to determine the 
common trends. The roles of social capital (SC) on collective actions (CA) in nature resource management were 
analyzed by reviewing different relevant literatures.  
 
3.1 Source of data  
Theoretical and empirical literature review on relevant to the role of human capital in collective action on natural 
resource management; it includes among others, in the areas of : 
• Environmental protection  
• Forest management  
• Truism  management activities  ,  
• Common pooled resource management 
• Water, soil and fishery management  
• Climate change management 
• Wild life management 
• Agro- forestry development 
 
4. Conclusions and recommendations 
Based on investigating a series of theoretical and empirical evidences on the role of social capital in collective 
action, mainly in natural resource management areas, the following conclusions and recommendations are worth 
drawn: 
Examined literatures generally indicated that natural resources need protection from destructive actions of 
people to achieve sustainable development. Yet communities have shown in the past and increasingly today that 
they can collaborate for long-term resource management. Social capital variables like heterogeneity index, 
bridging and linking social capital, civic engagement, cooperative norms, limited numbers of participants and 
formalized groups are found to be very significant and positively affecting collective action for community’s 
achieving sustainable natural resource development. Particularly, the variables are playing a fundamental role in 
reducing transaction cost of exchange; reduce cost of enforcing rules and information asymmetry ;and improve 
local authority performance by pooling them in the networks .Likewise, the study found that in an homogeneous 
communities trust is a critical element for collective action even in un limited number of participants. Specifically, 
most studies confirmed that bridging and linking social networks produced a strong influence on collective action 
more than any other variable. However, the effect of community-level social trust was small and did not explain 
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far more than individual-level (leaders) social networks exerted influence on collective action. Furthermore, 
bridging and linking social capital are very significant for mobilizing collective actions, and voluntarily 
establishing linkages with external agents through their own efforts (e.g., governmental officials, political groups 
and credit sources) on behalf of potential user groups. 
Likewise, most literatures have also found that in a homogeneous community, bonding social capital 
considered as a success factor for facilitating trust, reciprocity and unselfish behavior among community members. 
Consecutively, which are necessary ingredients for cooperation, operational rule setting, enforcement, 
transparency and accountability for achieving common goals of community collective action? Top above, most 
literatures also identified  that  effective management of collective action, mobilization of bridging and linking 
social capital are equally important as they do not only help mobilize external resources but, at times, also promote 
bonding social capital 
This study is also aimed to review literatures to investigate whether there is positive relation between social 
capital and collective environmental action. Most study used model estimation of social capital variables in 
collective action revealed that the higher the social capital level, the more likely individual is willing to contribute 
in collective action to protect the natural resource. Results also found that individuals with higher degree of social 
capital are more likely to participate in collective actions because they can access more information, develop 
linkages and engage in decision making processes. Similarly, based on the findings, most literature also showed 
that in formalized groups, social capital is high, and people have the confidence to invest in collective activities in 
achieving their common natural resource goals.  
Similarly, study indicated that aside from financial challenges, lack of social capital is a barrier to collective 
action for community based natural resource management. Nearly all literatures also suggested that investment in 
building social capital have diverse benefits for collective action to address common environmental challenges. 
Findings alike inform that investing in social capital variables are very crucial for policy interventions and practice 
in natural resource management particularly in low and middle income countries. In consistency with the findings, 
group size is also indicated as a significant aspect of social capital building because as membership increases it 
becomes more difficult to develop trust and reciprocity relationships among members.  
As per the findings of the study, it is recommended that policy makers may take due consideration that 
investment in building social capital have multi-dimensional benefits for collective action to address natural 
resource management challenges 
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